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Abstract
In two games of  INPDG, four people chose a green or 
red card individually. The green one always produces the 
best outcome for individuals if  all the others chose red 
and the worst outcome if  all chose green. All who choose 
red cards optimize points. In no case any group choose 
red in Condition A (Baseline 20 trials). Metacontingencies 
were added (cultural consequences on VR 2 for various 
combinations of  choices) and manipulated across the next 
2 conditions, selecting for at least 3 red cards (B condition) 
or at least 3 greens (C condition). Verbal behavior was 
allowed in one group (GV), and for the last session of  the 
other group (GNV); the choices in these groups stabilized 
on all red (or all green), depending on the metacontingency 
in effect. Although groups without verbal behavior ended 
with 3 of  4 participants choosing red in accordance with 
the metacontingency, all 4 participants in both groups 
reached consensus on choosing green.
Keywords: Metacontingencies – Prisoner’s Dilemma Game – verbal 
behavior
Resumen
En dos juegos de INPDG, cuatro personas eligieron una 
tarjeta verde o rojo de forma individual. El verde siempre 
produce el mejor resultado para las personas si todos 
los otros optaron por el rojo y el peor resultado si todos 
eligieron verde. Todos los que eligen las tarjetas rojas 
optimizan puntos. En ningún caso, ningún grupo elige 
rojo en condición A (Línea de base de 20 ensayos) Las 
metacontingencias se agregaron (consecuencias culturales 
de las combinaciones de opciones enVR2) y fueron 
manipulados a través estas 2 condiciones, la selección de 
por lo menos 3 tarjetas rojas (condición B), o por lo menos 
3 tarjetas verdes (condición C). se permitió la conducta 
verbal en un grupo (GV), y para la última sesión del otro 
grupo (GNV), las opciones de estos grupos estabilizados 
todos de color rojo (o todo verde), dependiendo de 
la metacontingencia en vigor. Aunque los grupos sin 
la conducta verbal terminaron con tres de los cuatro 
participantes en la elección de color rojo, de acuerdo con 
la metacontingencia, los 4 participantes de ambos grupos 
llegaron a un consenso sobre la elección de color verde.
Palabras clave: Metacontingencias – Juego Del Dilema Del Prisionero 
– Conducta verbal.
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Prisoner’s Dilemma Game – 
PDG) is a tool of  applied mathematics to analyze how social 
interactions and their possible products can be quantified 
and predicted (Axelrod, 2006, Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Fiani, 2004). In this analogy of  social interactions, 
combining responses from two or more organisms is what 
determines the products of  this interaction. Thus, the 
product may be beneficial for all organisms to a greater or 
lesser magnitude, as it can provide differences in earnings 
between the group members. 
Rachlin, Brown and Baker (2001) describe these possible 
relationships in terms of  positive reinforcement and 
punishment. For these authors mutual positive reinforcement 
occurs when participants enter into an agreement on an 
optimal molar alternative, gaining similar magnitudes of  
reinforcement. The situation of  punishment occurs when 
one of  the participants receives reinforcements of  greater 
magnitude than the others. Mutual punishment occurs when 
all participants choose the greater magnitude alternative 
available, but the combination of  these responses produces 
equal and low magnitude reinforcement for all. 
These descriptions corroborate the definition of  social 
behavior for behavior analysis. Skinner (1953/2001) defines 
social behavior as the behavior of  two or more people 
regard to one another or together related to a common 
environment. The concept of  social behavior, therefore, 
involves the behavior of  two organisms in which the 
responses of  one of  the organisms functions as a source 
of  stimulation, antecedent or consequent, for the behavior 
of  the other (De-Farias, 2005; Skinner, 1953/2001). 
The studies of  PDG with humans and nonhumans have 
shown control by the immediate consequence (molecular 
control) (Flood, Lenderman &Rapapport, 1983; Green, 
Price & Hamburger, 1995; Hall, 2003; Sanabria, Baker & 
Rachlin, 2003). This pattern has made some authors think 
of  PDG as a tool for studying self-control.
Ever since the first experiments with games, the contact 
between participants was minimized or even prohibited 
because of  the game features. Usually, the experimenter or 
a computer acted as the other player, and the experimental 
manipulation was conducted by means of  this virtual 
member. In the current literature, this experiment is 
sometimes considered to be impersonal and distant to 
social situations of  the natural environment. Furthermore, 
direct communication between all participants of  the game 
has made the response of  cooperation predominant (Kerr 
& Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). 
A number of  studies have been conducted on the 
effect of  communication on the responses of  cooperation 
and coordination (e.g., Cronin, Kurian & Snowdon, 2005; 
Dugatkin & Alfieri, 1991; Dugatkin & Wilson, 2000; 
Mendras & Waal, 2000; Milinski, 1987; Milinski et al., 1997; 
Noë, 2006). Two lines of  research with chimpanzees are 
very important to evaluate the role of  communication in 
coordinating the responses. Both of  them follow Crawford`s 
model (Cronin, Kurian & Snowdon, 2005; Dugatkin & 
Alfieri, 1991; Dugatkin& Wilson, 2000), in which two 
chimpanzees had ropes at their disposal and were given 
food only when both of  them responded simultaneously. 
Mendros and de Waal (2000) presented a bar to pairs of  
monkeys. The bar was counterbalanced so that it could not 
be pulled by only one of  the subjects, thus producing food. 
Later, the pair was separated by an opaque plate to prevent 
eye contact or by a translucent plate. Subjects coordinated 
less their responses in the presence of  the opaque plate 
which led to the interpretation that communication is 
essential for the coordination of  responses. 
In PDG is necessary that less or no information is 
transmitted between the group members who require the 
separation of  players in different cabins, eliminating the 
communication and ensuring to each player that there are 
other participants in the game. According to Mendros and 
de Waal (2000), this increases the responses frequency that 
produce unequal gains. Milinski (1987) and Milinski et al. 
(1997) showed that the mere presence of  another organism 
increases the likelihood of  the subject to cooperate, even 
when the other is just a reflection in the mirror of  the 
experimental subject. Clements and Stephens (1995) and 
Stephens, Maclin and Stevens (2002) in order to test the 
cooperation between two organisms, connected two boxes 
of  operant conditioning for pigeons. The cooperation of  
the subjects was named instrumental cooperation and it was 
the only pattern reinforced. Thus, isolated responses of  a 
subject did not produce reinforcement. The instrumental 
cooperation was considered analogous to the response in 
the triple contingency - the interlocking responses or the 
instrumental cooperation produced reinforcement. The 
results showed that a cooperative pattern may be reinforced 
directly without the need of  communication, since the two 
subjects were spatially isolated and did not communicate. 
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Data from researches that do not allow communication 
between human participants show a pattern of  cooperative 
responses, although a longer time is required for the emission 
of  such responses (Yi & Rachlin, 2004; Chen &Komorita, 
1994; Chaudhuri, Sopher & Strand, 2002). Sanabria et al., 
(2003) presented data with pigeons showing a cooperative 
pattern in PDG which may suggest that, unlike what was 
stated in the field of  social behavior, verbal behavior is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of  
cooperative social behavior, but some accessory stimuli 
or contingencies are necessary to clarify the contingency 
in effect and to prevent the subjects from choosing the 
molecularly maximized magnitude alternative. 
Another variable studied was the number of  people 
involved in the PDG (Fox & Guyer, 1977; Yi & Rachlin, 
2004). Research shows that the more people who are 
involved in the PDG the higher the individual competition. 
The main explanation is that such gains are calculated by 
an equation; and as an alternative always generate more 
points than the other, this alternative is molecularly most 
likely to be chosen.
Specifically the Yi and Rachlin study (2004) was the first 
behavior analytic PDG study with groups. The authors used 
five players in the procedure. Only one of  the players was 
a real subject. The responses of  the others were controlled 
by a computer according to solving strategies of  the game. 
The procedure consisted of  choosing between X and Y. X 
was the alternative with the possibility of  higher earnings 
and Y was 7 points less than X. Two strategies were used, 
TFT and RANDOM. In TFT, all virtual participants begin 
the game choosing X. For each participant’s response in 
Y, one of  the virtual participants chose Y in the following 
trial. Thus, 4 consecutive responses in Y by the participant 
resulted in 4 virtual players choosing Y in the fifth trial. For 
the responses in X the same relationship was in effect. For 
each response in X by the participant, one of  the virtual 
players would choose X in the following trial. The results 
were clear in showing that when the strategy was TFT 
participants increased the rate of  choosing X, while when 
the RANDOM strategy was in effect (50% chance for each 
alternative on each trial) the rate of  choosing Y increased. 
This can be due to the fact that choosing Y could produce 
more points regardless of  their previous response.Then, 
choosing Y was an alternative to maximize points. Ortu, 
Woelz and Glenn (2008) replicated Yi and Rachlin (2004) 
in a metacontingency study using four actual participants. 
Metacontingency is defined by Glenn (1986, 1989, 1991, 
2004) as a process where  a cultural consequence can select 
interaction patterns that are replicated within and across 
generations. Metacontingencies have three terms: the IBC 
(interlocking behavior contingency), where the responses 
of  organisms function as antecedent or consequent for 
the response of  the others; the aggregate product that is 
only an effect of  the IBC; and the cultural consequence 
that is the responsible for the selection of  IBCs and the 
aggregate product. The concept is based on the description 
of  the third level of  selection where there is a consequence 
that selects patterns of  interaction of  the group (Skinner, 
1984). Some studies have been developed to produce data 
to support this concept. The data suggest that the cultural 
consequence has the function of  selecting IBCs and the 
aggregate product (Nogueira, 2009; et al., 2010; Ortu, 
Woelz & Glenn, 2008; Vichi, Andery & Glenn, 2009).
In the study of  Ortu et al., (2008), the combination 
of  responses were the IBCs that produced the aggregate 
product, which was the sum of  the individual consequences. 
(The sum was only possible as a result of  a particular 
combination of  participants` responses.) The cultural 
consequence was the presentation of  the market gains or 
losses, which added or subtracted points for the group 
contingent on the aggregate product of  the IBC. There were 
two conditions and the participants could communicate 
through a chat room throughout the experiment. In 
Condition A the target aggregate product was XXXX 
(all participants choosing the alternative X) and the 
cultural consequences were as follows: +10 points for the 
combination XXXX; 0 points for XXXY; -3.3 points for 
XXYY; -6.6 points for XXXY and -10 points for YYYY. 
The signs of  plus and minus of  the cultural consequences 
were inverted in Condition B. In almost 80% of  the trials 
the most frequent IBC was the one that produced 10 points 
from the market only when the individual contingencies 
were inconsistent with the metacontingency (Condition B, 
in which it was necessary that everyone chose Y receiving 
a low amount of  individual points in order to receive the 
greatest cultural consequence). After the achievement of  
the stability criterion of  eight consecutive trials with the 
emission of  the same combination in conditions A and 
B, fading of  the cultural consequence was implemented. 
The fading procedure did not alter the frequency of  IBC 
already selected in each condition. Thus, further exposure 
to the cultural extinction condition was necessary for 
participants to return to responding for individual gain. 
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This study is a systematic replication of  Ortu et al., 
(2008) with the overall objective of  investigating the effect 
of  individual and cultural consequences on the coordination 
or the interlocked choices of  participants in the Iterated 
n-players Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (INPDG) with four 
players, which differs from pairs usually employed in the 
game. Among the specific objectives two variables are 
considered: (1) the cultural consequence and (2) the verbal 
interactions in brief  intervals.
Method
Participants
Eight undergraduate students from five degree programs 
of  Universidade de Brasilia: Nutrition, Pharmacy, Psychology, 
Wood Engineering and Information Science. The groups 
were arranged in such a way that the 4 participants did 
not know each other and were from different programs.
The average of  participants was 24 with standard 
deviation of  6 (18 - 30 years old). 
Instruments
There was a 90 cm height, 3m width table. There was a 
3m length, 1 m height wooden divider on the table. Three 
Styrofoam dividers connected to the wooden dividers 
formed 4 separated individual places, allowing no visual 
contact; dividers were of  75 cm width and1 m height. The 
table and dividers were 2.5 m from a projection screen 
and this screen was 1m x 1m so that the participants 
could see it. There were chairs for each participant and 
experimenters. There was one laptop with Excel© to 
record the participants` choices, individual and cultural 
consequences, and a projector to show the sheet to the 
participants. 
The task involved the choice by each participant of  a 
red or green card on each trial. Each card was 14.85 cm 
length, 21 cm width. 
Procedure
At the beginning each participant read and signed the 
informed consent which presented the general information 
and objectives about the task. By participating in the research 
the students could receive up to 5 points out of  100 in a 
class from the Basic Psychological Processes Department. 
Each hour of  participation resulted in 0.5 points.
At the end of  the experiment the individual and 
group points were exchanged for lottery tickets for a US$ 
25.00 prize (R$ 40.00). The proportion was 100 points 
per ticket. Each participant had tickets of  one specific 
color and the group ticket was of  a different color. If  
one of  the individual tickets was drawn, the participant 
associated with the ticket received the amount. If  a group 
ticket was drawn the amount was equally divided among 
the 4 participants.
The 8 participants were divided in two groups: one with 
no communication (GNV) and one with short periods 
of  communication (GV). In each session there were 4 
participants and 3 experimenters. The participants did not 
see each other until the end of  the experiment. 
The instructions were given by the experimenters and 
each participant had a printed copy in front of  them. The 
following general instruction was given:
 “You will participate in a study of  learning in group. 
It is very important that you don’t know each other, 
please don’t try to discover the others. You will be 
asked to choose between 2 colored cards. Depending 
on the combinations of  cards chosen you will receive 
different numbers of  points and sometimes you will 
also receive points for the group which will be shared 
at the end of  the study. Please don’t talk to each other. 
Thank you.”
 For the GV group, the last sentence was changed for: 
“Please talk to each other only when the experimenters 
say that you can.”
The following features of  the game were used:
1. INPDG with 4 members.
2. Cultural consequence on a VR 2 schedule (the cultural 
consequence was presented on average every 2 trials).
3. The participants of  the GV group could talk to each 
other for periods of  two minutes between conditions.
4. In the first condition (Baseline) there was no cultural 
consequence and no communication for all groups.
5. The choices were simultaneous:
“Please make your choice and pick one of  the cards.”
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6. The players saw the pay off  for all group members.
 This research used equations to calculate the individual 
consequence (Yi & Rachlin, 2004).
Equation 1 calculates the individual consequence of  
players who picked the red card. R is the number of  points 
received by the players who picked Red and Z is the number 
of  players who picked Red. Thus, the participant who 
chooses Red will receive 12 points if  3 participants choose 
this option. Equation 2 shows G as the number of  points 
received by players who picked Green and it is always 7 
points more than the number of  points received by the 
participants who picked Red. Thus, the participant who 
chooses Green will receive 19 points if  all the other three 
participants choose Red. All the combinations, individual 
consequences, aggregate product (sum of  individual points) 
and cultural consequences by condition are shown in Table 1.
There were 3 conditions and the sequence of  presentation 
of  the conditions was not the same for both groups. It 
depended on whether or not the group achieved the stability 
criterion in a particular condition and the number of  trials 
the group took to achieve it. The stability criterion was 
the presentation of  combinations that produced positive 
cultural consequence in 5 consecutive trials from a block 
of  ten trials or in 60 trials in the same condition. 
The conditions were:
Condition A –20 trials with no cultural consequence, 
only the INPDG with four members and individual 
consequences as calculated by the equations. This condition 
was used to evaluate patterns of  combinations (IBCs) 
before the cultural consequence was implemented and it 
was used to determine the next condition. If  there were 
combinations with at least 3 Reds, the next condition 
would be Condition B and if  there were 3 or 4 Greens the 
following condition would be Condition C. This strategy 
was used to strengthen the target combinations and make 
it easier for the groups to contact the cultural consequence.
Condition B –Minimum of  10 trials. This condition 
lasted until the achievement of  the stability criterion 
or until the 60th trial, whichever occurred first. In this 
condition there was a cultural consequence, called Market 
feedback, on a VR 2 schedule. This cultural consequence 
was positive if  3 participants had chosen red – RRRG 
(addition of  36 points to the group) or if  4 participants 
had chosen red – RRRR (addition of  60 points to the 
group). Thus, if  in a trial with a programmed cultural 
consequence the combination of  choices was RRRG, 
the Market feedback would be 36; and if  it was RRRR, 
the Market feedback would be 60 points. There were also 
cultural consequences with subtraction of  points from 
the group for the combinations RGGG (-36 points) and 
GGGG (-60 points). For the combination RRGG there 
was not any cultural consequence programmed. 
Condition C- In this condition the target IBCs was 
inverted. Thus, the addition of  points to the group by 
the Market was contingent on IBC combinations RGGG 
(addition of  36 points) and GGGG (addition of  60 
points) and the subtraction of  points was contingent on 
IBC combinations RRRG (subtraction of  36 points) and 
RRRR (subtraction of  60 points). The same criterion was 
used for the end of  this condition (see Table 1). 
Table 1 shows the combinations (IBCs) in the first 
column, the individual consequences based on the 
combinations in the second column, the aggregate product 
(the sum of  individual consequences) in the third column 
and the cultural consequence in the fourth column. 
Table1
Points received by the participants (individual 
points) and by the group (cultural consequence) 
in Conditions A, B and C according to the 
combinations of choices (IBCs).
Combinations 
of Choices
Individual Aggregate Cultural Consequence
(IBCs) Points Product Condition B Condition C
RRRR 16/16/16/16 64 60 -60
RRRG 12/12/12/19 55 36 -36
RRGG 8/8/15/15 46 0 0
RGGG 4/11/11/11 37 -36 36
GGGG 7 / 7 / 7 / 7 28 -60 60
Results
Figure 1 shows the molecular distributions of  aggregate 
products on the y-axis. Each aggregate product stands 
for a specific IBC as Table 1 shows. The experimental 
conditions are shown on the x-axis at the exact sequence 
presented in the experiment. In Condition B, the IBC 
RRRG (aggregate product = 55) produced 36 points and 
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the IBC RRRR (aggregate product = 64) produced 60 
points. In Condition C, the IBC RGGG (aggregate product 
= 37) produced 36 points and the IBC GGGG (aggregate 
product = 28) produced 60 points. These combinations 
were the target IBCs. 
It is possible to see that the GNV group (with no 
communication) shows more variability of  IBCs. This group 
received more positive cultural consequences of  36 points in 
Condition C because one of  the participants chose Green all 
the time. In the second and third sessions (third A – x-axis) 
the participants in the GNV group started to present the 
combination GGGG in Condition C and RRRG in Condition 
B. In the last session of  this group (when communication was 
allowed – seventh A – x-axis) the most frequent IBCs and 
aggregate product were those which produced the highest 
number of  points for the group. These data show the role 
of  verbal behavior in the coordination of  choices.
However, it is not possible to say that the verbal behavior 
was required for coordination since three participants from the 
GNV group coordinated their choices in a way that produced 
positive cultural consequences before communication was 
allowed. Furthermore, in the GV group (with constant 
communication) some participants chose Green in Condition 
A (without cultural consequence) even though this wasn`t 
a good option to optimize the individual points. 
These data suggest that the coordination is an effect 
of  the interaction between cultural consequences and 
communication. However, the cultural consequence alone 
was enough to produce some degree of  coordination. 
In the group with communication the changing of  IBCs 
was faster, avoiding losses of  cultural consequences and 
quickly responding in accordance with the new condition. 
The more persistent pattern emitted by this group was 
GGGG (aggregate product = 28) in Condition C and 
RRRR (aggregate product = 64) in Condition B.
When the cultural consequence was withdrawn for the GNV 
group (second, fourth and sixth presentations of  Condition 
A) there were still choices in Green, even after Condition B. 
Figure 1. Aggregate products by trials in all experimental conditions.The value of the aggregate product is positively related to the number of Reds in a combination. Thus, 
when the aggregate product was 64, that means that all participants chose Red (64 = RRRR; 55 = RRRG; 46 = RRGG; 37 = RGGG and 28 = GGGG)
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In the last presentation of  Condition A for the GNV group 
(eighth presentation of  Condition A, with communication) 
and in the last two presentations of  Condition A for the GV 
group, the most frequent IBCs were RRRG and RRRR.
 Figure 2 shows the relative distribution of  IBCs on the 
y-axis and the experimental conditions on the x-axis. With 
the exception of  the first three conditions in the first session 
of  the GNV group, the most frequent IBCs were those 
which produced positive cultural consequence - GGGG 
and GGGR in Condition C; RRRR and RRRG in Condition 
B. It is possible to notice that in the GNV group the most 
frequent combination was the target IBC with three equal 
choices, while in the GV group and in the fourth condition 
of  the GNV group the most frequent combinations were 
GGGG or RRRR. Approximately 70% of  the IBCs were 
those which produced positive cultural consequence.
Figure 3 presents the molar earnings received from the 
Market until the end of  the experiment. It is possible to 
notice that both groups have the same graph shape, with 
a higher percentage of  positive cultural consequences in 
the GNV group (?) (68% in the GV group and 88% in the 
GNV group). The negative cultural consequence was the 
second highest bar. It is possible that the negative cultural 
consequence functioned as a discriminative stimulus for 
changing the IBCs because it produced losses for the group.
The lower bar represents no cultural earnings or losses. It 
is noteworthy that in the GNV group the most frequent 
cultural consequence was 36 points for combinations with 
three equal choices, while in the GV group and the fourth 
session of  the GNV group the most frequent cultural 
consequence was 60 points.
Discussion
More research is needed to support theoretical assertions in 
the field of  metacontingencies. Skinner (1984) suggested a 
third level of  selection where a consequence for the group 
selects interactions between members of  groups rather 
than individual responses. Glenn (1986, 1988, 1989, 1991, 
2004) presents the concept of   a cultural consequence that 
is able to select interaction patterns that are replicated 
within and between generations.
Figure 2. Relative distribution of the IBCs by condition. The frequencies of the IBCs were divided by the number of trials in each condition.
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Figure 3. Molar distribution of cultural consequences
The goal of  this experiment was initially to determine 
whether a cultural consequence could select interlocking 
behavioral contingencies patterns (IBCs) in an Iterated 
n-players Prisoner’s dilemma game (INPDG). This game 
was chosen because of  its feature of  having concurrent 
choices where one choice produces more individual points 
than the other. However, the other choice produces more 
points for the group if  all participants choose this option. 
The data suggest that the cultural consequence selected 
combinations of  choices (called here IBCs) even with 
the participants not seeing each other or communicating 
(GNV group). The cultural consequence was a coordinator 
choice to produce the target IBC and aggregate product 
that generated positive cultural consequences and avoided 
negative cultural consequences. These data are consistent 
with results of  other experiments showing that cultural 
consequences can select IBCs, even though the coordinated 
pattern that is selected is disadvantagous for the individual 
(Ortu et al., 2008; Vichi , Andery & Glenn, 2009; Nogueira, 
2009, 2010). In this experiment this situation was represented 
by Condition C in which to produce the biggest magnitude 
of  cultural consequence (60 points for the group) the 
participants had to receive a small number of  individual 
points (7 points). 
However, the GV group and the fourth session of  
the GNV group suggest that the verbal behavior also 
functions to accelerate frequency of  the target IBCs as 
well as producing fast change of  the IBCs in accordance 
with changes in the experimental conditions. 
Dugatkin and Reeve (1998) define communication as 
the relationship between the responses or clues emitted 
by an organism influencing the behavior of  another 
organism. Those authors do not refer to verbal or vocal 
language but the interaction between the responses of  
two organisms. The same happens to the definition of  
IBCs. Two experienced fishermen who fish together do not 
need to vocally request a response from the other. Their 
nonverbal responses are enough to evoke responses that 
generate a cultural consequence. One fisherman pulling 
strongly a fishing rod is a discriminative stimulus for the 
other fisherman to help the first one pull in the fish.
Animal signs serve to facilitate and coordinate social 
interactions. These signs may relate to the external 
environment or to the social environment of  specific groups 
(Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998; Maynard Smith, 1982). This 
confirms the previous assertion, but it describes a function 
of  communication that had not been reported, that is, 
describing the individual and group contingencies. Likewise, 
none of  the authors speak of  linguistic behavior, but 
information exchange. When in danger, some animals 
position themselves or emit grunts under control of  
imminent danger in the external environment, which evokes 
responses of  other group members to flee or protect them 
in a safe environment. 
Specifically in the case of  human animals both functions 
can be attributed to verbal behavior. Participants in the GV 
group and the fourth session of  the GNV group accurately 
described the individual contingency and metacontingency 
in place. Even when the condition changes, the participants 
of  the GV group choose in agreement with the description 
rather than the new condition metacontingency. The GV 
Group presents an interesting data in the fourth presentation 
of  Condition B. One of  the participants suggested that 
three participants should choose the red card and one 
participant should choose the green card in every trial and 
that they should alternate who would choose the green card, 
which offers the highest amount of  individual points. This 
happened for 6 consecutive trials until another participant 
realized this was not the best strategy for getting more 
points and proved it to the others.
These data are consistent with experiments in the field 
of  rule-governed behavior where the participants follow 
the rule even when the rule is inaccurate (Fonseca, 2008; 
Galizio, 1979, Ribes & Rodriguez, 2001; Rosenfarb et al., 
1992) as well as with experiments in the field of  cultural 
practices that use communication and analyze the verbal 
interactions of  the participants showing the same effect 
(Baum et al, 2004; Baia, 2008, Leite, 2009). In these 
studies, it was noted that participants followed the rules 
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even if  they were inaccurate, especially a type of  rule 
called mythological which suggests a response without 
describing the contingency. 
Finally, the interaction of  the coordinating role of  
the cultural consequence and verbal behavior observed 
in this study was replicated by Nogueira (2009) showing 
that in groups in which the communication was allowed 
the proportion of  IBCs that produced positive cultural 
consequences was higher than in groups without 
communication.  
For future research on the role of  verbal behavior 
in metacontingencies, we suggest manipulation of  two 
types of  individual consequences as well as a general and 
constant cultural consequence. Individual consequences 
would include those contingent on the verbal description 
of  the participant`s future responses and those contingent 
on the responses themselves, similar to an experiment of  
correspondence say-do /do-say. The experiment would be 
a replication of  this study. The question is whether there 
is functional independence between verbal and nonverbal 
behavior in metacontingencies. In each condition there 
would be two minor conditions, in which the first individual 
consequence would be for the participants` performance 
and the second one for their report of  their individual 
performance. Sometimes the positive consequence would 
be contingent on an accurate report of  their performance 
and sometimes on an inaccurate report. In another condition 
the target verbal report would be an accurate or inaccurate 
report emitted by the group. This suggestion follows the 
logic of  say-do correspondence experiments as in Catania, 
Mathews and Shimoff  (1982) and Torgrud and Holborn 
(1990). 
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